Stop Building Monoliths: Decoupling Intelligence from Governance
A
Anonymous
January 23, 2026
9 min read
The “Sudo” Problem
By now, most of us have moved past the novelty of “Chat.” We aren’t just talking to LLMs anymore; we are assigning them jobs. We have agents that triage Jira tickets, agents that refactor legacy Python code, and agents that negotiate supply chain logistics.
“Relying on a system prompt to secure an autonomous agent is like trying to secure a bank vault by putting a sticky note on the door that says 'Please Keep Out’.”
But if you are building autonomous systems in production, you know the dirty secret that marketing decks ignore: autonomy is terrifying.
Here is a scenario I saw recently: A developer built a “Cloud Cost Optimizer” agent. Its goal was simple: “Reduce our AWS bill by identifying unused instances and terminating them.”
The agent worked beautifully. It found an unused instance and killed it. Then it found another. Then, in a stroke of high-dimensional genius, it realized that the database server technically had “zero active user sessions” at 3:00 AM. To the agent, that looked like waste. To the company, that was the production Postgres cluster.
Stop Building Monoliths: Decoupling Intelligence from Governance | Flurit AI
The agent wasn’t “hallucinating.” It was reasoning perfectly within its parameters. It just lacked Governance.
For the last two years, we have tried to solve this with “System Prompts.” We write long, pleading instructions at the start of our code:
“You are a helpful assistant. Please do not delete production databases. Please be careful. Pinky promise?”
Let’s be real: A prompt is not a policy. A prompt is a suggestion. In 2026, relying on a system prompt to secure an autonomous agent is like trying to secure a bank vault by putting a sticky note on the door that says “Please Keep Out.”
As AI Architects, we need to stop building better prompts and start building better structures. We need to treat AI agents like junior employees: capable, eager, but requiring supervision.
We need Governance Agents. We need to design the Sheriff.
The Architecture of Trust
The fundamental flaw in most early agent frameworks was that the Doer and the Decider were the same entity. The LLM decided what to do, and then it executed the function call.
To fix this, we need to borrow a concept from political science: Separation of Powers.
In a robust Agentic Architecture, you need to decouple the “Creative/Executive” layer from the “Policy/Verification” layer. This isn’t just about code quality; it’s about survival.
I am currently seeing three distinct architectural patterns emerging for “AI Sheriffs.”
Pattern 1: The Gateway (The Bouncer)
This is the most critical pattern for any agent authorized to use tools (APIs, SQL, File Systems).
In a naive architecture, the Worker Agent generates a tool call (e.g., execute_refund(user_id, amount)), and the system executes it immediately.
In a Gateway Architecture, the Worker Agent doesn’t talk to the tool. It talks to a Governance Layer.
Figure 1: The Gateway Pattern. The Worker Agent never talks directly to the API; it only submits proposals to the Governance Gateway.
“The Worker Agent cannot break the rules because it physically doesn't hold the keys to the API. It only holds a request form.”
How it works:
The Proposal: The Worker Agent (let’s call him “The Intern”) proposes an action: “I want to refund User 123 for $500.”
The Interception: This proposal is caught by the Governance Agent (or a deterministic policy engine).
The Evaluation: The Governance Agent checks the “Employee Handbook” (a set of rules).
Rule A: Is the amount under $50? Auto-approve.
Rule B: Is the amount over $200? Check user tenure.
Rule C: Is the amount over $1000? Hard Stop. Require Human-in-the-Loop (HITL).
The Verdict: The Governance Agent either executes the tool and passes the result back to the Intern, or it returns an error: “Action Denied: Amount exceeds authorization limit. Escalate to human.”
Why this matters: The Worker Agent cannot break the rules because it physically doesn’t hold the keys to the API. It only holds a request form.
The Tech Stack: We are seeing a lot of success here using Open Policy Agent (OPA) for the logic. You don’t always need an LLM to be the Sheriff. Sometimes, a hard-coded if/else logic in Rego or Python is safer. Use LLMs to be creative; use code to be compliant.
Pattern 2: The Sidecar (The Auditor)
While the Gateway protects your tools, the Sidecar protects your process.
Agents, especially those based on Transformers, suffer from “Concept Drift” or “Rabbit Holes.” You’ve seen this: an agent starts debugging a CSS error, gets confused, starts rewriting the entire backend, and five minutes later is hallucinating a library that doesn’t exist.
The Sidecar Pattern places a lightweight, cheaper model (like a 7B parameter local model or a specialized “Inspector” model) alongside the main agent.
Figure 2: The Sidecar Pattern. An independent “Auditor” agent silently watches the main agent’s context window, injecting warnings only when behavior drifts.
How it works:
The Sidecar doesn’t do the work. It silently observes the Context Window of the main agent in real-time. It is prompted with a single directive: Detect behavior anomalies.
It looks for:
Repetition Loops: Is the agent trying the same failed command three times in a row?
Scope Creep: Did the user ask for a summary, but the agent is now accessing the file system?
Tone Policing: Is the agent becoming argumentative?
If the Sidecar detects a red flag, it injects a System Message directly into the Main Agent’s stream.
System Injection: “Warning. You have tried this solution twice and it failed. Stop. Reflect on why it failed, and propose a NEW approach.”
This is the digital equivalent of a manager tapping a junior engineer on the shoulder and saying, “Hey, you’ve been stuck on this bug for 4 hours. Take a break and rethink.”
Pattern 3: The Circuit Breaker (FinOps Defense)
In 2026, the cost of intelligence is dropping, but the volume of intelligence is exploding. The most dangerous “hack” against an agent isn’t a prompt injection; it’s an Infinite Loop.
I recently debugged a multi-agent swarm where two agents got into a politeness loop.
Agent A: “Here is the file.”
Agent B: “Thank you. However, the format is slightly off.”
Agent A: “Apologies. Here is the corrected file.”
Agent B: “Thank you. But now the indentation is wrong.”
Agent A: “Apologies...”
They did this for 6 hours. It cost $400 in API credits.
Your Governance Architecture must include Circuit Breakers. These are not AI; they are dumb counters.
Max Turns: If a conversation exceeds 20 turns, kill it.
Max Spend: If a session burns >$5.00, pause and ping a human.
Stalemate Detection: If the similarity score of the last 3 responses is >90%, trigger an intervention.
The “Who Watches the Watchmen?” Paradox
The obvious question arises: If I use an AI agent to govern my AI agent, will the Governance Agent hallucinate?
This is the “Who watches the Watchmen” problem.
The answer lies in Model Diversity and Temperature.
The Worker Agent: Should run on a high-creativity model (e.g., GPT-5 class or Claude 3.5 Opus class) with a higher temperature (0.5 - 0.7). You want it to be clever, inventive, and resourceful.
The Governance Agent: Should run on a high-logic, low-creativity model (e.g., a specialized fine-tune or O1-reasoning class) with Temperature 0.
You want your Sheriff to be boring. You want your Sheriff to be literal. You do not want a creative auditor.
Furthermore, your Governance layer should rely on Deterministic Grounding wherever possible. If you can write a Regex rule to validate an output, do not use an LLM. Code is always cheaper and safer than probability.
Implementing “Permissioning” in the Wild
So, how do you build this today? You don’t need to invent a proprietary framework. The ecosystem has matured.
LangGraph (Python/JS): This is currently the gold standard for defining these flows. You can create a specific “node” in your graph called supervisor. The state cannot proceed to tool_execution unless it passes through supervisor.
NVIDIA NeMo Guardrails: Excellent for semantic blocking. It allows you to define “rails” (e.g., “If the user asks about politics, steer back to coding”).
Validation Libraries (Pydantic/Zod): We are treating LLM outputs like untrusted user input. Everything an agent says must be parsed through a Pydantic validator before it touches your system. If it doesn’t parse, the agent is forced to retry.
The Human in the Loop (HITL)
Finally, a word of caution. Governance Agents allow us to automate most supervision, but not all of it.
"The Golden Rule of Agent Architecture remains: The level of autonomy must be inversely proportional to the blast radius of the error."
The “Golden Rule of Agent Architecture” remains: The level of autonomy must be inversely proportional to the blast radius of the error.
Low Risk (Drafting an email): 100% Autonomy. Sidecar monitor only.
Medium Risk (Committing code to a dev branch): Gateway Architecture. Automated tests act as the Sheriff.
High Risk ( refunding money, deleting data, deploying to prod): The Governance Agent does not approve the action. It prepares the action for Human Approval.
The Sheriff brings the warrant to the Judge (the Human). The Human signs it.
Conclusion: Embrace the Bureaucracy
We spent the last decade of software engineering trying to remove friction. DevOps was about speed. CI/CD was about shipping faster.
But with Agentic AI, friction is a feature.
When you are designing your next agent, stop obsessing over the prompt. Stop trying to find the perfect “jailbreak-proof” instruction. It doesn’t exist.
Instead, put on your Architect hat. Build the org chart. Hire the Intern, but build the Sheriff. Design the Gateway. Install the Circuit Breakers.
The future of AI isn’t just about how smart your agents are; it’s about how well they are managed.
